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Abstract Several philosophers have recently argued that phenomenology is well-
suited to help understand the concepts of health, disease, and illness. The general
claim is that by better analysing how illness appears to or is experienced by ill
individuals—incorporating the first-person perspective—some limitations of what is
seen as the currently dominant third-person or ‘naturalistic’ approaches to under-
stand health and disease can be overcome. In this article, after discussing some of
the main insights and benefits of the phenomenological approach, I develop three
general critiques of it. First, I show that what is often referred to as naturalism tends
to be misunderstood and/or misrepresented, resulting in straw-man arguments.
Second, the concept of normality is often problematically employed such that some
aspects of naturalism are actually presupposed by many phenomenologists of
medicine. Third, several of the key phenomenological insights and concepts, e.g.
having vs. being a body, the alienation of illness, the epistemic role of the first-
person perspective, and the idea of health within illness, each bring with them new
problems that limit their utility. While acknowledging the possible contributions of
phenomenology, these criticisms point to some severe limitations of bringing
phenomenological insights to bear on the problems facing philosophy of medicine
that should be addressed if phenomenology is to add anything substantially new to
its debates.
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It has become common to lament the current status of various debates within the
philosophy of medicine, especially with regard to providing definitions of the
concepts of health, disease, and illness (e.g., [1–3]). One way of addressing this
issue, which has seen a recent increase in attention, is to bring insights from
phenomenology to bear on medicine in general and on the concepts of health,
disease, and illness more specifically (e.g., [4–10]). These authors claim that by
better analysing how illness appears to or is experienced by individuals—
incorporating the first-person perspective—some limitations of what they see as
the currently dominant third-person approach to health and disease can be
overcome. This first-person approach is usually traced back to the various
‘founders’ of phenomenology,1 e.g., Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Maurice
Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Hans-Georg Gadamer, to name a few, as well
as to various philosophers in the 1980s such as Richard Zaner [11] and S. Kay
Toombs [12], the latter of whom edited the 2001 Handbook of Phenomenology and
Medicine [13].
In this article, I will proffer a general critique of using phenomenology to
understand health and illness, of going ‘back to the ill persons themselves’ [14,
p. 4]. While there are many contemporary philosophers doing work on this subject, I
will mainly focus on some ideas expressed by S. Kay Toombs, Havi Carel, and
Fredrik Svenaeus as they can arguably be seen as representative attempts to bring
phenomenology into medicine [1, pp. 8–9]. The point is not necessarily to dismiss
the entire approach tout court, as there may be some important theoretical and
practical insights that can be gained when the experience of illness is described and
analysed through the eyes of the ill individual, e.g., Carel’s patient ‘tool-kit’ [15].
But phenomenology’s value and uniqueness remain to be seen.
In what follows, I will develop three main critiques of some of the central
arguments made by these recent phenomenologists. After going over some of the
main insights and benefits of the phenomenological perspective, I will show how
there is a tendency to present a rather impoverished view of naturalism such that the
possible descriptions available to naturalists are often misrepresented or misunder-
stood, resulting in a straw man argument. I will then show how there is some
ambiguity regarding the usage of the concept of ‘normality’, bringing some authors
quite close to certain naturalistic claims. As such, this approach seems to support
aspects of the position that it claims to amend or criticize. Finally, I will argue that
many of the prototypical phenomenological insights regarding the lived experience
of illness bring with them new problems that undermine their apparent utility.
Together, these criticisms will reveal some of the limitations of bringing
phenomenological insights to bear on the problems facing the philosophy of
medicine and, thereby, question phenomenology’s contributions to these debates.
1 Phenomenology is clearly a rather heterogeneous area of philosophy, and I simply cannot do justice to
this in this article. Instead, my point is merely to pick out some recent ideas in the phenomenology of
medicine and question their coherence and usefulness.
392 J. Sholl
123
Author's personal copy
Some insights of phenomenology
According to many phenomenologists, there are several main benefits of going ‘back to
the ill persons themselves’. First, there is the general suggestion that by undertaking a
phenomenological analysis of lived experience, one can show the limitations of
understanding the pathological in only objective, scientific terms. The main limitation is
that this objective approach excludes ‘first person experience and the changes to a
person’s life that illness causes’ [5, p. 10]. To address this limitation, phenomenologists
often begin by highlighting some aspects of what it means for humans to be embodied
beings, e.g., the human body is described as the ‘condition of possibility for perception
and action’ [6, p. 35]. By starting from embodiment, or from the lived body as it is
altered through illness, the aim is to counter the claim that illness is merely a ‘biological
dysfunction to be corrected by medical experts’ [5, p. 10]. In other words, illness ‘is
experienced by the patient not so much as a specific breakdown in the mechanical
functioning of the biological body, but more fundamentally as a disintegration of his
‘‘world’’’ [12, p. 207]. As such, the subjective first-person perspective of phenomenol-
ogy is pitted against the neutral and objective (and objectifying) third-person
perspective of ‘naturalism’. Phenomenology thereby raises the problem of ‘sidelining
the individual’ [16, p. 1103] and offers a way to reintroduce individuality back into
medical theories.2 ‘Instead of viewing illness as a local disruption of a particular
function, phenomenology turns to the lived experience of this dysfunction. It attends to
the global disruption of the habits, capacities and actions of the ill person’ [5, p. 10].
Consequently, the aim is not to replace this third-person perspective but to augment it.
As I will show below, however, neither the critiques of ‘naturalism’ nor the suggested
ways to amend it are as clear as they might seem.
By beginning from the idea that humans are intimately connected to their world
through their body, it seems clear that understanding illness requires an
understanding of how this bodily connection is disrupted and how this, in turn,
alters other aspects of human experience, such as spatiality and temporality [17].
For example, with illness comes a restriction on one’s capacity for interacting with
the world, such that what was once easily accomplished, like climbing stairs, now
becomes a problem [12]. Dimensions such as high and low, far and near are
distorted through illness. Illness also restricts one’s sense of time in that it has the
tendency to focus one’s attention much more on the present moment as one’s future
becomes uncertain, e.g., due to a chronic illness [5]. Such aspects of illness which
may remain unclear, and possibly bracketed, from an objective point of view can
thus be brought into the foreground by looking at how illness is experienced.
From this stress on embodiment, two further insights arise regarding the (human)
body: as unified and as transparent. First, it is often claimed that since we are
necessarily embodied beings, it is problematic to think that the self ‘has’ a body.
Rather, for a phenomenologist, we do not have our bodies, but we are our bodies [18].
The claim, then, is not that the self can be reduced to the body, but that the body is
2 Tania Gergel [16] also provides some interesting critiques of phenomenology, such as that it is not as
original or radical as it claims, that it is potentially solipsistic, and that while it claims to bracket and
question our everyday assumptions about illness, it struggles to do so.
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fundamentally a lived body: ‘my body is me’ [5, p. 32]. Moreover, as this embodiment
entails that our consciousness is also embodied, we cannot separate, either
conceptually or empirically, consciousness and body [5, p. 16]; body and mind are
unified or integrated in our lived experience of the world. This position is used to
counter what some call the dualistic ‘Cartesian paradigm’ that tends to separate mind
and body or reduces the body to a mere physical machine that is used by the mind [12].
Second, support for this unified view of human existence is often derived from the
very experience of when the body breaks down, as in illness, revealing the different
ways in which the body can be experienced, e.g., as my lived body or as an object
(Leib and Ko¨rper in Husserlian terms). In these experiences, the ‘harmony between
the biological and the lived body is disrupted and the difference between the two
becomes noticeable’ [5, p. 31]. For example, we often pay no attention to our
digestive system until we have diarrhea or are constipated, or we ignore our legs until
they hurt or prevent us from walking or running. The lived body thus has a
‘transparency’ that is lost when it breaks down and turns into an obstacle to our
desired goals, appearing as a mere object or as something ‘other’ [12]. This distinction
between lived and objective body also helps to account for those conditions in which
there is a gap between objective descriptions and lived experience. Some examples
are that of having a phantom limb where the individual feels the limb as present even
though it is not objectively there, or anorexia nervosa, where the individual’s body
appears to most as emaciated, yet is lived as if overweight or cumbersome [6,
pp. 40–41]. The claim here is that the objective facts alone will be insufficient to
understand these conditions, hence the need for the first-person augmentation.
From the phenomenological perspective, then, illness is characterized as not
merely a biological dysfunction (disease), but more fundamentally as a ‘dis-ability’,
as involving the inability to ‘engage the world in habitual ways’ [12, p. 207], as ‘a
modification of an ability to be that is lost’ [5, p. 83], or as an ‘unhomelike being-in-
the-world in which the embodied ways of being-in of the self (person) have been
thwarted’ [10, p. 104]. As Carel formulates it, contra Christopher Boorse, ‘illness is
not merely a dysfunction of a body subsystem but a systematic transformation of the
way the body experiences, reacts, and performs tasks as a whole’ [6, p. 41]. One
implication of this approach is a focus on what philosophers of medicine typically
refer to with the concept of ‘illness’ rather than ‘disease’, the former referring more
to the subjective and value-laden aspects and the latter referring to objective
biological dysfunctions [19]. Going ‘back to the ill persons themselves’, then,
entails the critical claim that a focus on disease, as objective biological dysfunction,
sidelines the important insights that could be gained by studying the lived
experience of illness. While most authors explicitly state that their concern is with
‘illness’ (e.g., [10]), I will show below that there remains a problematic tension with
regards to how these concepts are analysed and employed.
These various insights (embodiment, unified and transparent experience, illness
as global disruption) are therefore seen as crucial to providing a more holistic3
3 Svenaeus sees phenomenology as falling under the heading of ‘holistic’ approaches to health and
illness, of which Lennart Nordenfelt’s is another example [9]. However, Svenaeus sees phenomenology
as going further than a focus on ability or realizing vital goals by incorporating experience, perception,
feeling, and thinking.
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account of illness which can overcome the deficiencies of third-person approaches
[9]. In phenomenology’s ‘privileging’ of first-personal experience when trying to
conceptualize illness [5, p. 10], what is being criticized is the view that objective,
biological explanations alone can and should be the basis for medical judgments.
Of missed points and straw men
With these insights in mind, we can now move to what appears to be the main target
of phenomenologists of medicine: naturalism.4 As there are various ways in which
naturalism could be defined, I will rely on the depictions provided by these authors
in order to better capture how they justify their interventions. For example, Carel
defines naturalism as follows: ‘a label for a broad spectrum of views saying,
roughly, that natural or physical facts are sufficient to explain the human world. On
a naturalistic view, illness can be exhaustively accounted for by physical facts
alone. This description is objective (and objectifying), neutral and third-personal’
[5, p. 10]. Here, Carel expresses one of the main objections phenomenologists tend
to level against naturalism: it tends to describe the body solely in objective terms
and consequently mistakenly understands illness as merely (i.e., exhaustively
accounted for by) local biological dysfunctions. Naturalism is seen as being rather
limited as its attempts to provide an analysis of disease must bracket or ‘exclude the
first person experience and the changes to a person’s life that illness causes’ [5,
p.10]. Following the insights of the previous section—that overcoming this
seemingly narrow view of naturalism can be done by exploring the philosophical
implications of embodiment—the role of phenomenology is claimed to be to fill this
gap by elucidating lived experience or subjectivity. However, this broad view of
naturalism is problematic for various reasons.
On the most basic level, the fact that naturalism refers to a ‘broad spectrum of
views’ already suggests that some nuance is required to understand what naturalistic
descriptions entail. I will return to this issue shortly. Even accepting this definition,
there is another level of ambiguity. On the one hand, the phenomonologists’ target
could be what is called ontological naturalism, or the claim that nothing exists
except that which is studied by the natural sciences. This would imply that
experiential properties can be reduced to or explained by natural ones without any
appeal to ‘supernatural’ properties [24]. In the medical context, this could amount to
claiming that only diseases exist, since what we call illness can be reduced to
disease. On the other hand, phenomenology’s stress on the epistemic role of
subjective experience could be targeting methodological naturalism, or the
4 I shall set aside the issue of whether these approaches are better understood as ‘phenomenological
psychology’ or ‘transcendental phenomenology’ and how this plays out in phenomenology’s troubled
relationship to naturalism (see [20, 21]). It is possible that transcendental phenomenology is incompatible
with a core naturalistic claim that subjectivity emerges out of and can be described in fundamentally non-
subjective elements/processes. As these authors seem more interested in describing first-person
experience, they come closer to some form of phenomenological psychology. The following criticisms
stand regardless of this distinction. For more on these issues and recent attempts to relate phenomenology
and naturalism, see Petitot et al. [22] and Carel and Meacham [23].
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epistemic privileging of science. This would amount to claiming that scientific
determinations should take central stage in explaining the differences between the
normal and the pathological. As both could be used to explain the above quote, and
since they are distinct philosophical positions [25], more work is needed to clarify
just what ‘naturalism’ entails.
This ambiguity aside, many of their claims suggest that their concern is mainly
with ontological naturalism, though often formulated as a kind of reductive
physicalism. This can be seen in how naturalism supposedly describes illness in
terms of ‘purely’ or ‘nothing but’ physical facts, which can be exhaustively
accounted for by a third-personal or objective approach. This way of understanding
naturalism seems to be widely shared by many authors in the field. S. Kay Toombs,
for example, argues that such descriptions are a reflection of the ‘Cartesian
paradigm’ that ‘conceptualizes the physical body in purely mechanical terms’,
resulting in the omission of the ‘person to whom the body belongs, the person whose
body it is’ [12, p. 201]. This stress on ‘purely’ mechanical, ‘purely’ physiological, or
even ‘purely’ psychological explanations seems to mark this paradigm (though even
here one could question the conflation of Cartesianism and physicalism). For Carel,
‘The naturalistic approach provides a limited, biological picture of illness and
therefore fails to help us understand the experience of illness’ [5, p. 103].
Consequently, as mentioned above, her aim is not to replace naturalism, but to
‘augment’ it by bringing the aforementioned insights—e.g., embodiment and the
role of the lived body—to the foreground and thus to better understand illness.
Finally, in Svenaeus, this critique of (ontological) naturalism becomes even more
severe such that he sees phenomenology to be ‘fundamentally and from its
beginning an anti-naturalistic project’ [10, p. 100]. This anti-naturalism is explained
in terms of a rejection of ‘any attempt to reduce experience to material processes
only’ [10, p. 100]. The leitmotif running through these philosophers, then, seems to
be that of rejecting some form of reductionism which claims that scientific (i.e.,
‘purely mechanistic’ or ‘purely biological’) judgments alone, rather than personal
experiences, are sufficient to understand ‘illness’.5
Before I question this particular depiction of naturalism and its relation to some
form of reductionism [26], it can be helpful to see how it ties into the insights
mentioned in the previous section. Rather than assuming that illness is ‘merely’ a
localized biological dysfunction, a phenomenologist would attend to ‘the global
disruption of the habits, capacities and actions of the ill person’ and thereby explore
how illness is ‘a way of living, experiencing the world and interacting with other
people’ [5, p. 10]. The fact of embodiment entails that while biological explanations
may play an important role in adequately describing medical conditions, they are
insufficient for understanding how illness impacts all dimensions of one’s life [6,
p. 42]. Consequently, while appeals to experience may also be insufficient to fully
understand illness, embodiment makes such appeals necessary [9]. To take one
example, it is claimed that for a naturalist, depression would be described by
5 I use the scare quotes here since this claim is technically inaccurate. Naturalists do not claim to explain
‘illness’ scientifically, but rather ‘disease’. This confusion is already at work in the citations in this
paragraph, and I will return to it below.
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appealing to ‘nothing more’ than ‘brain function, neurotransmitters, serotonin levels
and so on’, whereas the phenomenologist would discuss the subjective or
experiential aspects, such as ‘loss of appetite, the dark thoughts, the listlessness
and sense of doom and so on’ [5, p. 10]. By moving from the physiological (third
person) to the personal, one can arrive at a deeper understanding of illness. One key
challenge to ‘naturalism’, then, is that its reliance on ‘biological’ explanations tends
to overlook the fact that medicine is in the business of treating persons inhabiting a
world of meaning or intentionality [9, p. 227].
This depiction and critique of naturalism creates various problems. First, by
claiming that naturalism views ‘illness’ in ‘purely’ biological terms, this critique
seems to confuse the conceptual difference between disease and illness. One way to
understand the naturalists’ distinction between disease and illness is to see disease
as definable in terms of biological malfunction(s) and to see illness as an undesirable
disease (e.g., [19]; see also [27, 28] for different approaches).6 As naturalists claim
that both concepts are needed to make sense of medical practice—since not all
conditions that are considered diseases should be considered illnesses or should
receive treatment—this distinction helps acknowledge the role of clinical values and
personal preferences for understanding the application of medical concepts. With
this in mind, if the argument of the phenomenologist is that ‘disease’ is understood
in ‘solely’ biological terms, then no naturalist would disagree because that is
precisely their goal. If the argument is that ‘illness’ is not solely biological as it also
involves values and subjectivity, then it also misses the point. For the naturalist, the
concept of ‘illness’ is already understood as being ‘not merely’ biological, but also
value-laden (for Boorse [29], it is a ‘disease-plus’ concept), so there would be no
problem in augmenting ‘disease’ with first-person descriptions of illness: the
acknowledgment of values in illness entails that illness is irreducible to disease.
There are even those who try to use both biological properties and value judgments
to understand disease or ‘disorder’, while remaining within a broadly naturalistic
framework [30, 31]. Consequently, ‘augmenting’ or ‘supplementing’ [9] the
naturalist approach by providing first-person descriptions of ‘illness’ would likely
be readily accepted by nearly any naturalist. The phenomenologists do have a point
in that naturalists have not really developed the illness side of the disease-illness
distinction, and in this sense, they do indeed leave out or set aside questions of lived
experience. However, the question remains as to whether the insights gleaned from
first-person approaches cannot also be accounted for from within the naturalistic
framework.
A more charitable reading could suggest that despite this conceptual confusion,
the real target of phenomenologists seems to be any view that might reduce illness
to or explain it solely in terms of disease (understood as a biological dysfunction).
The problem that arises here, however, is that this critique seems to misunderstand
the content of the basic naturalistic stipulation that ‘disease’ be defined without
reference to subjective evaluative concepts such as ‘good’, ‘bad’, or ‘desirable’ [19,
32]. While someone like Boorse aims to provide a description of disease based on
6 Boorse [19] adds that an illness is also marked by requiring special treatment and even allowing for
certain behaviors associated with that illness to be excused.
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findings from the life sciences, this does not mean that he endorses reductionism or
physicalism or that he cannot account for how disease affects various aspects of an
individual’s life. It simply means that he has given epistemic priority to scientific
explanations in general when trying to define disease. For example, his account of
function [33] is based on a systems account, whereby a disease results from a
breakdown in one of the subsystems of the body that causally contributes to the
organism’s survival and reproduction. This breakdown could occur at any level,
from the molecular to the psychological or organismic, and could be provoked
through internal or external causes. As such, this form of (methodological)
naturalism relies on scientific descriptions but says nothing about whether the
descriptions are ‘solely’ molecular, physiological, psychological, social, etc., as it
leaves open which science is best suited to clarify how the normal has become
pathological. One need not provide an airtight defense of naturalism to see that
naturalist theories have much more available to them than what is ‘purely’
mechanical or physical, such that a more nuanced form of naturalism is not only
possible, but can actually incorporate some of the concerns of the phenomenologists
discussed above. Insofar as these authors refer to some form of reductive naturalist
position, they present a rather impoverished view of what a naturalist view of
disease entails, turning it into a straw man.
Some ways in which naturalistic descriptions can go beyond those suggested by
the above depictions can be seen in what they consider to be normal and
pathological. When looking at theories concerning what is ‘normal and natural’, a
narrow depiction of naturalism can misrepresent its ability to account for the
varieties of human experience [26] and the adaptability of human beings. For
example, it is perfectly naturalistic to describe human beings as complex, multi-
dimensional, and dynamic as a result of their biological plasticity and ability to
shape their environment [34–36]. While some have tried to redefine health and
disease based on the biological property of homeostasis [37], an even more dynamic
understanding of how humans adapt to and anticipate environmental stressors can
be seen in the concept of allostasis, which describes how humans and other
organisms change biochemically, physiologically, psychologically, and even
behaviourally to meet varying internal and external demands [38]. Finally, I
discussed the injunction in phenomenology to see humans as embodied and
encultured beings. While this is indeed an interesting area of contemporary research
in terms of how culture shapes human behaviour and physiology [39], this finding is
far from new as it has been extensively studied by ethologists and ecologists for
over a hundred years [see 40 or 41]. The claim here is not that adaptability,
embodiment, and enculturation need or even can be reduced to some lower level of
explanation, e.g., biochemistry, but that various levels (from biochemistry to
psychology and sociology) can be used to describe the same phenomena that are of
interest to phenomenologists. Scientific theories have progressed a lot since the
beginnings of phenomenology and it would behoove recent theorists to be more
open regarding what can be said from within a naturalistic framework.
On the side of the pathological, some more nuanced naturalistic descriptions
could be drawn from network theory, which focuses on how symptoms group
together into causal networks in psychopathology [42], or on how networks in
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biological systems clarify health and disease more generally [43, 44]. There are also
attempts to show how microbiology is reshaping our understanding of health and
disease [45], and the inescapable relation humans have to their physical and
biological environment (e.g., [46]). This latter focus on the interactions between
individual variations and changing environments allows for interesting bio-social
approaches that do not reduce disease to some ‘entity’ in the individual, but see
disease as involving disruptions of an individual’s relation to its environment [47,
48]. These approaches either converge with or directly utilize insights from social
learning and labelling theories, helping them to better account for how being
labelled as ‘diseased’ or ‘ill’ contributes to the very manifestation of a given disease
in a given culture [48].
These are just a few examples in which ‘naturalism’ has far outgrown the
‘purely’ mechanistic approach of the past, if one ever really existed outside of the
minds of philosophers. While these are all admittedly third-person approaches, the
point is that ‘disease’ can be naturalistically understood without it being simply
some ‘purely’ biological dysfunction precisely because it has many different
scientific descriptions at its disposal. Building on these different theories, nothing
would prevent disease from being conceptualized as a global disruption of an
individual’s habits, capacities, and actions. If some naturalists have failed to fully
develop this point, it is not due to a fault fundamental to naturalism.
There is also an important area which seems to go unaddressed, which is the
science of psychology as that science wherein many aspects of experience are
indeed studied and developed, even if from the ‘third-person’ perspective. Take the
issue of depression mentioned above, which Carel uses to show the shortcomings of
naturalism [5]. Psychological studies of depression do not see it as ‘merely’
involving neurotransmitters and serotonin levels (and so on), but describe how
various biological aspects—biochemistry being only one of them—shape and are
shaped by the experiences of anhedonia, grief, guilt, psychomotor retardation,
troubled sleep, loss of appetite, variations in stress hormones, and learned
helplessness [49]. The neuroscientist Robert Sapolsky provides the following,
slightly tongue-in-cheek, definition of depression as a ‘genetic/neurochemical
disorder requiring a strong environmental trigger whose characteristic manifestation
is an inability to appreciate sunsets’ [49, p. 272]. This reveals a much more nuanced
scientific picture of the phenomenon of depression as a complex interaction of
biology, environment, and personal experience. Contra the reductive picture of
psychology painted by phenomenologists, psychology is not merely neurology or
neurochemistry, but also encompasses humanistic, existential, clinical, experiential,
psychoanalytic, etc. subfields, all while remaining in the third-person perspective.
Moreover, there is nothing that prevents psychological descriptions from being
used to understand and treat a variety of medical conditions (e.g., how
psychological stress plays a role in juvenile diabetes, hypertension, atherosclerosis,
stomach ulcers, and autoimmune disorders [49]), and the therapeutic effects of
various forms of stress management practices (e.g., knowing when denial can be
helpful, focusing on what can be controlled, getting the right information at the right
time, having an outlet for one’s frustrations, and having social support [49,
pp. 415–416]). Consequently, the experience of one’s disease, which
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phenomenologists call illness, is not outside the purview of scientific investigation.
This does not mean, of course, that there is no difference between the two
perspectives, or that nothing can be added by exploring first-personal accounts, but
it should be clear that the claim that experience gets excluded by ‘naturalism’ is
misleading at best.
Finally, this impoverished view of naturalism also distorts how naturalistic
approaches could even support the practical implications that phenomenology is
after, e.g., reintroducing individuality or seeing patients as persons. There is no a
priori reason why naturalism cannot contribute to the development of personalized
or patient-centred medicine [50]. The philosopher of biology Michel Morange
argues, for example, that many recent ‘reductionistic’ advances in medical
technology actually support a more personalized approach that sees the patient as
singular, each diseased individual exhibiting unique characteristics [51]. Oddly
enough, the rise of supposedly ‘objectifying’ tests has also contributed to better
understanding the role of genetic, biochemical, personal, and even cultural
differences. Consequently, with this increase in individualized information (coupled
with the aforementioned psychological approaches), doctors following rather
‘naturalistic’ lines can provide better information about a patient’s history, lifestyle
factors, and vulnerabilities. This, once transmitted to the patient, can go a long way
to bridging the gap between lived experience and an objective understanding of
disease.
Thus far, the main problem with these phenomenological approaches is that their
depiction of what naturalism is and what it has to offer in terms of understanding
disease seems to bear little resemblance to what is possible from within a naturalistic
framework such that it seems to be nothing more than a straw man. While it can
sometimes be helpful to simplify one’s opponent for argumentative clarity, the crucial
problem here is that it is precisely because these authors present a theory to which few
contemporary naturalists would likely adhere—one that is based on outdated and
rather misleading accounts of the life sciences, such as being ‘merely’ or ‘purely’
mechanical—that a need for its ‘augmentation’ appears justified. As I mentioned
above, the fact that some of these more complex views of naturalism have not been
fully incorporated into naturalistic theories does not mean that this cannot be done
[36]. While it is true that many phenomenological insights discussed above may hold
regardless of their views about naturalism, the problem is that if what they are
critiquing is formulated in such a narrow way, then the utility of their contributions
become unclear. Also, if the aim is to ‘augment’ naturalism, then this would imply
that some aspects of naturalism will remain untouched. As I will show in the next
section, the problem is much worse as phenomenologists seem to assume in their own
theory some aspects of naturalism that they claim to problematize.
The presumption of normality
A second set of problems that face these phenomenological approaches to medicine
has to do with some of their assumptions. More specifically, while trying to provide
an accurate description of the experience of illness, there is a tendency to take what
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is ‘normal and natural’ for granted and even to equate the concepts of normality and
health without adequately clarifying what they mean by ‘normality’. Consequently,
not only is naturalism not criticized on this point, but phenomenology seems to
downplay the difficulty of ‘liberating oneself completely from appeal to
external/fixed or objective ideas’ [16, p. 1105], and in doing so, it actually supports
a rather contentious aspect of naturalism.7
One way in which this presumption of ‘normality’ plays out can be seen in how
the language used by the authors entails, at least to some degree, a parasitic relation
to some form of common-sense statistical ‘normality’, i.e., normality understood as
that which most people do, most of the time. This occurs repeatedly in the context of
describing the distinction between the objective and lived body. For example,
Toombs writes about ‘the normal course of events’ that are disrupted in illness, such
as when one ‘cannot see properly’ [12, p. 216] (emphasis added). Carel follows this
formulation, claiming that ‘Normally, in the smooth everyday experience of a
healthy body…’ [5, p. 31], or in a ‘normal situation’ [6, p. 37], we can observe that
the ‘healthy body is transparent, i.e., taken for granted. This transparency is the
hallmark of health and normal function’ [6, p. 39] (emphasis added). These
formulations are quite interesting insofar as they link or possibly equate health and
‘normal function’, a position common to naturalism [55].8 Svenaeus also seems to
take up this link between health and normal function when he writes that ‘health
consists of a homelike being-in-the-world. Homelikeness is supposed to capture the
character of the normal, unapparent, transparency of everyday activities’ [10,
p. 107] (emphasis added).
On the one hand, there is a way to nuance such claims. For example, arguing that
health is ‘normally’ a life lived in transparency also implies that ‘health’ could be a
broader category encompassing individual variations [9].9 Some individuals may
struggle and experience their bodies as less than transparent, while still being
considered ‘healthy’. For example, the behavioural flexibility of individuals with an
impairment can allow them to use tools or other medical equipment to better adapt
to their condition and live a life less inhibited by their bodily configuration [5,
p. 102]. Thus, while health might ‘normally’ or typically be transparent, it need not
be, revealing that ‘normality’ need not be understood as a purely statistical concept.
On the other hand, while these references to normality could be seen as an
innocuous use of language, they become rather problematic when used to imply that
what is normal is universal or homogenous. In Svenaeus, this point becomes most
explicit since, on top of repeatedly using the concept or idea of normality along
similar lines, he goes further by claiming that phenomenology describes ‘the
experiences we are all having all the time’ [10, p. 98] (emphasis added). This allows
him to claim that such experiences can be found in ‘every normal child’ and even in
‘the normal [form of life]’ [10, p. 107]. Whether in the more nuanced form or not,
7 My point here is not to discuss the critiques of naturalistic views about what is ‘normal and natural’. For
more on this see [52–54].
8 While it is true that this equation could also be made by normativists, what is being incorporated here
by these phenomenologists is not the view that normality reflects one’s preferences, but rather what is
ultimately a naturalist claim, i.e., health is what is statistically normal or understood as normal function.
9 I thank one of the anonymous reviewers of an earlier draft for this qualificatory point.
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such claims are often made without demonstrating the basis for considering any
given experience as ‘normal’. That some individuals experience their body in a way
that could be described as transparent does not explain why this is typical or even
crucial to understanding human existence.
How these views on normality could become problematic can be further clarified
by pointing out a possible tension concerning the ‘aims’ of these phenomenological
approaches. For some, the central aim seems to be simply to describe some aspects
of an experience of illness [12], while ‘bracketing metaphysical debates and
ontological commitments’ [6, p. 34], whereas others seek to provide a phenomeno-
logical theory of what illness is [10, 14]. If the aim is merely descriptive, then
references to what is ‘typically’ or ‘normally’ experienced are still suspect, since it
is unclear how a singular experience could allow for any generalizations. If the aim
is explanatory, however, then the claims concerning normality as typical
transparency or as universal experience become more controversial.
For example, Svenaeus takes the latter route: ‘Phenomenology is an ontological
theory, proceeding from the claim that the first-person perspective is primary in
answering questions of what things—like health and illness—really are’ [9, p. 230].
This raises many questions. Most fundamentally, who or what determines what is
‘normal’, and what is the role of starting from these descriptions of ‘normal function’,
which may even touch on experiences that ‘we are all having all the time’? If these
descriptions capture what health or normality is, then normality would seem to
become a standard by which to determine what constitutes a deviation and therefore
an illness. Conversely, does a study of the ill experience serve as a way to clarify
‘normality’? If so, does this not assume some form of explanatory or ontological
priority with regards to ‘normal’ experience [47]? If phenomenological descriptions
claim to capture ‘normal’ aspects of human experience, e.g., the lived body in its
transparency, then further clarification of the role this concept plays is needed.
One can trace the roots of these assumptions back to one of the main inspirations
for this approach, Merleau-Ponty, whose ideas in Phenomenology of Perception
[18] were built on psychological research on brain damaged patients, e.g., the
Schneider case. By analysing how the mental or perceptual realm is transformed
through bodily changes, he sought to clarify how subjective experience is embodied.
However, by claiming that the pathological (i.e., brain-damaged patients) can be
used to clarify ‘normal’ or ‘everyday’ experiences, he problematically assumes a
positivistic claim first made by August Comte and Claude Bernard: it is by assuming
that the pathological state (whether ‘disease’ or ‘illness’) consists of a deviation
from the normal state that the former can be said to shed light on the latter [47]. For
a phenomenologist, this is an uncomfortable result since phenomenology has long
sought to distance itself from positivism.10
The problem at this point is that if one starts from first-person experience, the
only way to make any general claims about what health and illness are beyond
isolated accounts requires going beyond subjectivity into the realm of statistics and
norms. Consequently, if there are to be any insights about what ‘normal’ experience
10 This critique, that phenomenology ends up supporting positivism, can already be found in the end of
Foucault’s Birth of the Clinic [56].
402 J. Sholl
123
Author's personal copy
is, they cannot stop at the level of first-person descriptions. Phenomenology will
thus have to make use of naturalism in order to flesh out its theoretical explanations.
While the aim to augment naturalism is certainly in line with this implication, I feel
that the problem runs deeper. The issue here is not that of debating whether illness
or normality have certain structures as phenomenologically described. The issue is
that if phenomenology wishes to contribute to an explanation as to why illness and
normal experience have these structures to begin with, i.e., to provide ontological
explanations, then it will have to go beyond first-person accounts. The implication is
that doing so will question the need to privilege the phenomenological perspective.
Moreover, it remains to be seen as to whether a clear definition of illness can
even be given by prioritizing the first-person perspective. Attempts to define it in
terms of when these ‘normal’ embodied ways of being a person are ‘thwarted’, or
when the meaning structure of the individual has ‘fatally changed’ [9, 10], remain
rather vague and, as I will discuss below, remain somewhat limited in scope.
Consequently, such a theory would not likely be helpful for settling some more
pressing medical issues, e.g., misdiagnoses and over-medicalization. A potentially
more fruitful approach to criticizing reductionistic or positivistic views of health and
normality could involve entering into the medical and scientific discourses
surrounding these concepts and critiquing them on their own terms by showing
how these theories run into problems due to other findings within the life sciences
(e.g., [47, 54, 57]). In other words, by providing scientific claims that help to
undermine these narrow views of ‘disease’, or of seeing normality as merely a
statistical average, one can avoid the problems of using subjective experience to
criticize science and can more readily address the philosophical problems related to
medicine.
Furthermore, a more serious challenge to the naturalistic framework would be to
question the very disease-illness distinction. However, as I have argued in the
previous section, phenomenology’s focus on the concept/experience of illness
struggles to provide such a challenge, and if anything, it provides more support to
this distinction. In the end, while phenomenology may indeed contribute to a
clarification of what it feels like to be ill, its ability to provide an actual theory of
what illness is would seem to turn on the issue of what the ‘augmentation’ or
‘supplementation’ really entails, i.e., whether it will have to help itself to
‘biological’ theories. Even if illness is given priority, it seems that more is needed to
understand what illness is than appeals to experience. However, as I will now show,
prioritizing experience creates new problems.
Problems proper to phenomenology
While the first two sections focused on some problematic assumptions that are often
made by authors in this area, I would now like to focus on four problems that seem
to be unique to these phenomenological approaches. Their uniqueness stems from
the very insights and concepts that are claimed to be at the heart of what
phenomenology can bring to the philosophy of medicine and so their discussion will
further question the role of phenomenology in these debates. Here the guiding
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argument is that even if naturalism is augmented by a focus on illness, this focus
creates a new set of problems.
First, there appears to be a tension that can arise from the basic phenomeno-
logical claim that we do not have a body, but are our bodies—an idea that every
author readily accepts and employs. While this claim is developed in the context of
the concern not to ‘reduce’ someone to their biological malfunction, not to see them
as merely an object [5, p. 70; 12, p. 217], phenomenology could also contribute to
this problem. In other words, if one begins by arguing that body and self are
fundamentally intertwined, then what would stop one from concluding that we are
the illness that has transformed our body and subsequently our ‘being-in-the-
world’? If it is through our lived bodies that we experience the world, then as illness
transforms our body and world, ‘we become our ill selves’ [16, p. 1106]. Of course,
there is an important distinction to be made between reducing an individual to their
illness and merely equating the two. In other words, someone may be their illness,
but that person need not be only their illness. The problem is that as phenomeno-
logical views emphasize how illness is tied up with one’s identity [9, p. 232], the
line between equating and reducing is rather thin.11
Moreover, the very theory that a phenomenological approach distances itself
from a naturalistic one based, at least in part, on localization or the idea of having
one’s body/disease, could actually serve as a way to prevent such a reduction. If
disease is localized in or conceptualized as only one part of the individual, even if it
results in various transformations of that individual’s overall physiological and
psychological functioning, this need not result in a reductive view. Even a narrowly
conceived ‘purely biological’ approach could still conceptualize disease as simply
one aspect of one’s bodily constitution, with the implication that the individual is
more than their disease and so cannot be reduced to that which is malfunctioning in
their body. Seeing disease as a localized malfunction, then, could actually prevent
the reduction of the individual to their disease. On this point, phenomenology
provides less of a critique than merely another perspective. The same holds on the
side of health. For example, the sociologists/historians Nikolas Rose and Joelle Abi-
Rached claim that modern neuroscience does indeed promote the idea that we have
our brain [58]. However, they add that while this may contribute to problematic
individualistic descriptions and a focus on taking responsibility for our brain’s
health, it also opens the door to the idea that we can work on our brain, that our
brain’s functioning and plasticity are influenced by our actions, lifestyles, and
milieu: ‘human brains are both shaped by, and shape, their sociality’ [58, p. 22]. As
such, we need not begin from the premise that we are our bodies in order to
adequately conceptualize our embodiment and adaptability.
Second, and along similar lines, it is often suggested that the lived body becomes
distinct from the objective biological body in the experience of illness, e.g., we only
become aware of our lungs when we have trouble breathing. As a result, this can
lead to the feeling of alienation as one’s body is seen as an object, as something
11 Gergel [16] takes this problem in a different direction, arguing that while phenomenology’s stress on
bodily alienation helps to highlight how identity is challenged in illness, it does not provide a solution to
overcome this problem.
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thwarting one’s actions, and as being objectified during the medical encounter [12].
Even if this somewhat dualistic picture is ignored for the sake of argument, this
concept of alienation and the implications drawn from it need to be contextualized.
This ‘alienation’ could simply be a product of medical knowledge in contemporary
societies, e.g., disease/illness is now more often explained via a disease entity [59].
Medical anthropologists suggest that such alienation was not part of the experience
of illness for much of human history and only came about when the body was
viewed more objectively or scientifically [60]. This supports the claim that ‘The
body as understood by the people has always been indebted to the body as
understood by the faculty of medicine’ [61, p. 51]. While this would provide some
support for the phenomenological view that contemporary medicine ‘objectifies’
individuals by focusing ‘solely’ on bodily dysfunctions, it also suggests that what
phenomenology finds in this alienating experience of illness is less a basis for
making an ontological claim concerning the nature of illness, and more a result of
historically varying ways of thinking about illness.
Moreover, the ‘objectification’ occurring in a medical encounter need not be
negative. For example, many young females who feel ashamed for being messy,
unorganized, having trouble concentrating, and being introverted and depressed
might feel quite relieved when they find out that what they thought were ‘character
flaws’ are actually largely due to their neurobiology (in this case, ADHD) (e.g.,
[62]). In other words, this can lead to the thought that ‘it’s not me but my disease
that is causing me to behave like this’. This thought, which could also follow from
the view that we have our body/brain, could easily be seen as liberating for the
individual, especially for those who feel quite guilty about their behaviours. While
one could still object that such emancipatory experiences are rare, they are sufficient
to suggest that it can also be helpful to see one’s body as acting ‘against’ one’s will.
With these first two problems, it is clear that the issues of reduction and alienation
are more complex than often acknowledged and that the naturalist has more tools at
her disposal than it might seem.
A third problem is that by focusing on the experience of illness, a phenomenol-
ogy of medicine greatly reduces its scope on two accounts. First, it becomes
inescapably anthropocentric. This relates to the views of normality mentioned above
since ‘normal’ human experience or first-person accounts could only be provided by
conscious human beings. As such, a phenomenology of medicine can have little to
nothing to say about the health and disease12 of any non-human organism. While
this itself is not all that problematic, since there is nothing wrong with an explicit
concern to clarify human experiences and practices, the limitations of an approach
focused on the experience of illness run even deeper.
More seriously, this focus on personal experience results in a suite of medical
issues that cannot be addressed, or only problematically so, from within this
framework. For example, it seems quite easy to describe the experience of
pregnancy as being one of ‘disharmony’ or even ‘unhomelikeness’, whereby one’s
body feels alien to the self and is thwarting its endeavours, which is how illness is
12 I say ‘disease’ rather than ‘illness’ here since more arguments would be needed to show that ‘illness’ is
a category that also applies to non-human animals.
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often characterized.13 Without a clear, and ultimately objective, way to distinguish
health from illness, such cases remain problematic. Even if such cases are clarified
one could also mention the issues of anosognosia (the condition of being blind to
one’s medical condition, which often appears in patients who have suffered severe
brain injuries) or all the different disorders that occur during sleep, during fetal
development, and even during early infancy, prior to the development of memory
and ‘self-experience’. Any pathological condition whereby the problem facing the
individual occurs either while unconscious (e.g., sleep apnea) or prior to the full
development of consciousness itself (e.g., fetal disorders) simply cannot be
theorized within this approach since there is no way to access such subjective
experiences. Of course, their later experiential effects can be, such that one can
describe what it feels like to suffer from something like sleep apnea. But if the result
is merely being able to describe conscious child-adult experiences (also limited by
being illiterate or inarticulate), then this approach is rather limited in scope.
The final problem to be discussed also arises due to this prioritizing of first-
person experience. Here, this problem is played out in a tension between health and
happiness (or well-being), where it is sometimes taken for granted that they are
related.14 The suggestion seems to be that if health is ‘nothing but’ physiological
states, then it will be difficult to understand how one can be in a good mental state
while suffering physically or vice versa. While it is not a novel claim that
experience can clash with medical diagnoses, nor is it clear that all appeals to
experience will be equally helpful [16], a focus on first-person experience seems to
call into question the usual dichotomy between ‘health’ and ‘illness’. For example,
formulations such as ‘health within illness’ [5] are meant to capture the results of
studies which have shown that illness can ‘promote personal growth’ and can be a
‘tool of self-discovery and a fundamental source of later self-development’ [5,
p. 92]. These studies show that ‘Surprisingly, happiness does not correlate with
objective health (with the exception of pain and incontinence) and many substantial
chronic illnesses seem not to affect the ill person’s subjective sense of wellbeing’ [5,
p. 94].
It is not at all clear, however, why we should assume, or be surprised by, any lack
of correlation between happiness and health, or even between illness and a poor
quality of life. It is certainly quite easy to imagine a sad, yet otherwise ‘healthy’
individual, and vice versa. While pointing out that one can still be happy while ill
can certainly help to improve a patient’s experience of illness, it is odd to think that
13 This criticism was also raised following a 2011 lecture Svenaeus gave on phenomenological and
naturalistic theories of health at UWE Bristol, a video of which can is available at https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=Brwx9A0Es9c; see Svenaeus [9] for the published version of the lecture. While it is
certainly unfair to criticize impromptu responses at conferences, his response is nonetheless rather telling.
He claimed that pregnancy ‘cannot be incorporated in [his] general analysis of illness and health’ and that
it should be analyzed ‘on its own’. Interestingly, Boorse has this to say about any theory that pathologizes
pregnancy: ‘to call pregnancy per se unhealthy would strike at the very heart of medical thought; it is the
analytic equivalent of the ‘‘Game Over’’ sign in a video game’ [29, p. 44]. Analyzing the problem ‘on its
own’ will not make it go away.
14 This is not universally shared, since Svenaeus does attempt to distinguish between health and
happiness [9].
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anyone would deny this, especially a naturalist. This would only actually be
surprising if one were to begin by conflating health and well-being.
Setting this aside, while it does seem to be helpful to ask, e.g., whether someone
with a chronic illness can adapt to their illness and even develop new capacities,
some practical and conceptual problems remain. On a practical level, this mixture of
health within illness could have the unwanted effect of giving the individual a false
sense of hope concerning their condition, which could do more harm than good.
Whether this would happen would likely depend on the individual, the illness, and
its severity, but it remains a real possibility. On a conceptual level, while anyone can
accept the importance of having better and worse days or weeks during which
improvements are experienced or during which one finds ways to cope with or adapt
to their condition, such that they are establishing a new and improved level of
functioning, it remains unclear as to why these changes ‘within illness’ should be
labelled as ‘health’. If these improvements do not negate the fact that the individual
is still ill, then calling them ‘healthy’ seems to prevent a clear theory or even
conceptualization about what health and illness are. In other words, if one aim is to
help delineate what is unique to illness (or even the experience of it), then seeing
health within illness might obfuscate the qualitative changes that take place not only
physiologically but also experientially when one is ill, changes which are often
otherwise acknowledged by these authors.
Consequently, more arguments are needed to show that ‘health within illness’
can do more explanatory and practical work than already existing ideas, such as ‘ill
yet convalescing or coping well’. Similarly, it should be asked why ‘illness within
health’, which Svenaeus describes as ‘the tendency to fall into unhomelikeness very
easily’ [10, p. 108], is preferable to the idea of a precarious degree of health
whereby one is forced to live in a restricted way so as to avoid pathogenic
experiences that engender illness. One can perfectly well imagine that health and
illness come in degrees, existing along a continuum such that the line between them
is fuzzy and even varies from person to person [57, 63], without eliding their
qualitative difference.
Concluding remarks
The aim of pointing out these various presuppositions and problematic claims is to
reveal some of the limitations that a phenomenological approach will encounter as it
is brought into the larger debates within the philosophy of medicine. The very need
for an expansion of naturalism seems questionable once one takes into account the
variety of possible naturalistic descriptions, a phenomenological theory will need to
account for how a given experience can be considered normal, and even if the
possibility of an augmented naturalism is granted, the concepts phenomenology
proposes are problematic. As I mentioned, this approach can certainly provide some
useful insights into what it is like to experience health and illness, insights which
might be able to benefit from the trained analytic eye of the philosopher, as well as
insights into how better to bring medical practice in line with patient experiences
[15]. Gergel argues that phenomenology could serve as a way to better formulate
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some problems facing medicine [16], such as the need to reconcile individual
experience and the objective ideals of scientific evidence, though it also needs to
avoid suggesting facile solutions. For example, phenomenology’s focus on
subjective experience could help to clarify problems with pain measurement,
understanding treatment side-effects, and generally assessing treatment efficacy.
Though, as I argued above, even here, it is not clear exactly how phenomenology’s
first-person emphasis is distinct from what one finds in psychology and its various
subfields.
Another way of expressing this critique is to say that while phenomenology
might be a useful method for describing the lived experiences of illness, it remains
severely impoverished as a theory for explaining it. As I showed, however, even if
explanation is not the sole aim, there are still many problems that arise at the level
of description. This impoverishment needs to be addressed if phenomenology is to
add anything substantially new to the debates that cannot already be found in more
nuanced naturalistic approaches to understanding medical concepts and practices, or
even literary descriptions of the experience of illness.
Acknowledgements I would like to thank Andreas De Block, James DiFrisco, and Jeff Sholl for their
critical and ultimately helpful comments on previous drafts. I would also like to thank the anonymous
reviewers of this article for their useful suggestions. This research was undertaken as part of a post-
doctoral position funded by the Fonds Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek-Vlaanderen (Research Foundation-
Flanders).
References
1. Carel, H., and R. Cooper (eds.). 2013. Health, illness and disease: Philosophical essays. Durham:
Acumen.
2. Ereshefsky, M. 2009. Defining ‘health’ and ‘disease’. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological
and Biomedical Sciences 40(3): 221–227.
3. Hamilton, R.P. 2010. The concept of health: Beyond normativism and naturalism. Journal of
Evaluation in Clinical Practice 16: 323–329.
4. Aho, J., and K. Aho. 2008. Body matters: A phenomenology of sickness, disease, and illness. Lan-
ham: Lexington Books.
5. Carel, H. 2008. Illness. Durham: Acumen Publishing.
6. Carel, H. 2011. Phenomenology and its application in medicine. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics
32: 33–46.
7. Ratcliffe, M. 2008. Feelings of being: Phenomenology, psychiatry and the sense of reality. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
8. Svenaeus, F. 2001. The hermeneutics of medicine and the phenomenology of health. Linko¨ping:
Springer.
9. Svenaeus, F. 2013. Naturalistic and phenomenological theories of health: Distinctions and connec-
tions. In Phenomenology and naturalism: Exploring the relationship between human experience and
nature, ed. H. Carel and D. Meacham, 221–238. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
10. Svenaeus, F. 2013. What is phenomenology of medicine? Embodiment, illness and being-in-the-
world. In Health, illness and disease: Philosophical essays, ed. H. Carel and R. Cooper, 97–111.
Durham: Acumen.
11. Zaner, R. 1981. The context of self: A phenomenological inquiry using medicine as a clue. Ohio:
Ohio University Press.
12. Toombs, S.K. 1988. Illness and the paradigm of lived body. Theoretical Medicine 9: 201–226.
13. Toombs, S.K. (ed.). 2001. Handbook of phenomenology and medicine. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
14. Svenaeus, F. 2000. Das unheimliche—Towards a phenomenology of illness. Medicine, Health Care
and Philosophy 3: 3–16.
408 J. Sholl
123
Author's personal copy
15. Carel, H. 2012. Phenomenology as a resource for patients. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 37:
96–113.
16. Gergel, T.L. 2012. Medicine and the individual: Is phenomenology the answer? Journal of Evalu-
ation in Clinical Practice 18: 1102–1109.
17. Fuchs, T. 2013. Temporality and psychopathology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
12(1): 75–104.
18. Merleau-Ponty, M. 1962. Phenomenology of perception. Trans. C. Smith. London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul.
19. Boorse, C. 1975. On the distinction between disease and illness. Philosophy and Public Affairs 5(1):
49–68.
20. Husserl, E. 1977. Phenomenological psychology: Lectures, summer semester, 1925. Trans. J. Scan-
lon. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
21. Zahavi, D. 2013. Naturalized phenomenology: A desideratum or a category mistake? In
Phenomenology and naturalism: Exploring the relationship between human experience and nature,
ed. H. Carel and D. Meacham, 23–42. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
22. Petitot, J., F.J. Varela, B. Pachoud, and J.-M. Roy (eds.). 1999. Naturalising phenomenology.
Stanford: Stanford University Press.
23. Carel, H., and D. Meacham (eds.). 2013. Phenomenology and naturalism: Exploring the relationship
between human experience and nature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
24. Papineau, D. 2007. ‘Naturalism’. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/naturalism/. Accessed 20 Oct 2014.
25. De Caro, M., and D. Macarthur (eds.). 2010. Naturalism and normativity. New York: Columbia
University Press.
26. Dupre´, J. 2010. How to be naturalistic without being simplistic in the study of human nature. In
Naturalism and normativity, ed. M. De Caro and D. Macarthur, 289–303. New York: Columbia
University Press.
27. Eisenberg, L. 1977. Disease and illness: Distinctions between professional and popular ideas of
sickness. Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry 1: 9–23.
28. Conrad, P., and K.K. Barker. 2010. The social construction of illness: Key insights and policy
implications. Journal of Health and Social Behavior 51(5): S67–S79.
29. Boorse, C. 1997. A rebuttal on health. In What is disease?, ed. J.M. Humber and R.F. Almeder,
3–134. Totowa: Humana Press.
30. Wakefield, J. 1992. The concept of mental disorder: On the boundary between biological facts and
social values. American Psychologist 47(3): 373–388.
31. Wakefield, J. 2011. Darwin, functional explanation, and the philosophy of psychiatry. In Mal-
adapting minds: Philosophy, psychiatry, and evolutionary theory, ed. P.R. Adriaens and A. De Block,
143–172. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
32. Kingma, E. 2014. Naturalism about health and disease: Adding nuance for progress. Journal of
Medicine and Philosophy 39(6): 590–608.
33. Boorse, C. 1976. Wright on functions. Philosophical Review 85(1): 70–86.
34. Bateson, P., and P. Gluckman. 2011. Plasticity, robustness, development and evolution. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
35. Laland, K.N., and G.R. Brown. 2006. Niche construction, human behavior, and the adaptive-lag
hypothesis. Evolutionary Anthropology 15: 95–104.
36. Sholl, J. forthcoming. Contextualizing medical norms: Georges Canguilhem’s Surnaturalism. In
Naturalism in philosophy of health: Issues, limits and implications, ed. E´. Giroux. Dordrecht:
Springer.
37. Ananth, M. 2008. In defence of an evolutionary concept of health: Nature, norms, and human
biology. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing.
38. Schulkin, J. 2003. Rethinking homeostasis: Allostatic regulation in physiology and pathophysiology.
Cambridge: MIT Press.
39. Richerson, P.J., and R. Boyd. 2005. Not by genes alone: How culture transformed human evolution.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
40. Gilbert, S.F., and D. Epel. 2009. Ecological developmental biology: Integrating epigenetics, medi-
cine, and evolution. Sunderland: Sinauer Associates Inc.
41. Jablonka, E., and M.J. Lamb. 2004. Evolution in four dimensions: Genetic, epigenetic, behavioral,
and symbolic variation in the history of life. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Putting phenomenology in its place: some limits of a… 409
123
Author's personal copy
42. Borsboom, D., and A.O.J. Cramer. 2013. Network analysis: An integrative approach to the structure
of psychopathology. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology 9: 91–121.
43. Baraba´si, A.L., N. Gulbahce, and J. Loscalzo. 2011. Network medicine: A network-based approach
to human disease. Nature Reviews: Genetics 12(1): 56–68.
44. Gross, F. 2011. What systems biology can tell us about disease. History and Philosophy of the Life
Sciences 33: 389–396.
45. Dupre´, J. 2012. Processes of life: Essays in the philosophy of biology. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
46. Dubos, R. 1965. Man adapting. New Haven: Yale University Press.
47. Canguilhem, G. 1989. The normal and the pathological. Trans. C.R. Fawcett and R.S. Cohen. New
York: Zone Books.
48. Murphy, D. 2006. Psychiatry in the scientific image. Cambridge: MIT Press.
49. Sapolsky, R.M. 2004. Why zebras don’t get ulcers, 3rd ed. New York: St. Martin’s Griffin.
50. Childs, B., C. Wiener, and D. Valle. 2005. A science of the individual: Implications for a medical
school curriculum. Annual Review of Genomics and Human Genetics 6: 313–330.
51. Morange, M. 2008. Retour sur le normal et le pathologique. In Philosophie et me´decine: en hommage
a` Georges Canguilhem, dir. A. Fagot-Largeault, C. Debru, and M. Morange, ed. H.-J. Han, 155–169.
Paris: Vrin.
52. Amundson, R. 2000. Against normal function. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and
Biomedical Sciences 31(1): 33–53.
53. Kingma, E. 2010. Paracetamol, poison, and polio: Why Boorse’s account of function fails to dis-
tinguish health and disease. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61: 241–264.
54. Sholl, J., and A. De Block. 2015. Towards a critique of normalization: Canguilhem and Boorse. In
Medicine and society: New perspectives in continental philosophy, ed. D. Meacham, 141–158.
Dordrecht: Springer.
55. Boorse, C. 1977. Health as a theoretical concept. Philosophy of Science 44(4): 542–573.
56. Foucault, M. 2003. The birth of the clinic: An archaeology of medical perception. Trans. A.M.
Sheridan. London: Routledge.
57. Canguilhem, G. 2008. Knowledge of life. Trans. S. Geroulanos and D. Ginsberg. New York: Fordham
University Press.
58. Rose, N., and J.M. Abi-Rached. 2013. Neuro: The new brain sciences and the management of the
mind. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
59. Hucklenbroich, P. 2014. ‘‘Disease entity’’ as the key theoretical concept of medicine. Journal of
Medicine and Philosophy 39(6): 609–633.
60. Fa´brega, H. 1997. Evolution of sickness and healing. Berkeley: University of California Press.
61. Canguilhem, G. 2012. Writings on medicine. Trans. S. Geroulanos and T. Meyers. New York:
Fordham University Press.
62. Yagoda, M. 2013. ADHD is different for women. The Atlantic. http://www.theatlantic.com/health/
archive/2013/04/adhd-is-different-for-women/381158/?single_page=true. Accessed 20 Oct 2014.
63. Kendler, K.S., P. Zachar, and C. Craver. 2011. What kinds of things are psychiatric disorders?
Psychological Medicine 41: 1143–1150.
410 J. Sholl
123
Author's personal copy
